Penthouse 4C, LLC v. 100 Harborview Drive Council of Unit Owners (Cir. Ct. Balto. City)

Filed: June 5, 2012.

Opinion by Judge Evelyn Omega Cannon.

Held:   The Circuit Court for Baltimore City held that it had jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award on a petition filed within 30 days after the arbitrators’ decision on a motion to modify the award, that the arbitrators did not exceed their jurisdiction in awarding the Plaintiff LLC the amount of costs of living and relocation expenses of the LLC’s sole member who was not a party to the arbitration, and that the award would not be vacated for manifest disregard of the law because the Defendant could not show that the arbitrators disregarded the law after understanding and correctly stating it. Finally, the Circuit Court refused to modify the specific performance part of the award based on Defendant’s evidence presented to the Court but not to the arbitrators.      

Facts: On March 9, 2010, the Plaintiff LLC, whose sole member was the primary resident of a condominium managed by the Defendant condominium council and directors, sued for specific performance and damages alleging that that the Defendant’s failure to perform required maintenance caused water exposure damage (mold) in the Plaintiff LLC’s condominium unit. The Plaintiff LLC’s sole member, an individual residing in the unit, was not individually named as a party to the suit.

The Circuit Court granted the Defendant’s motion to stay pending arbitration and after five days of hearings, on November 28, 2011 a majority of the three retired judges serving as arbitrators awarded the Plaintiff $1,252,487 in damages, including $433,722 for the sole member’s consequential costs, and ordered the Defendant to perform the required maintenance.

The Plaintiff filed a petition to confirm the award in the Circuit Court.   A day later the Defendant filed with the arbitrators a motion to modify the award as to what all agreed was an inadvertent mistake. On December 28, 2011 the majority panel issued its modification of the award, in part. On January 23, 2012 the Defendant filed in the Circuit Court a Petition to Vacate the Monetary Award and to Modify the Award’s order of specific performance.

Analysis:   The Circuit Court first addressed the Plaintiff’s claim that the Petition to Vacate was not timely filed. Relying on Mandl v. Bailey, 159 Md. App. 64 (2004),  the Circuit Court found that an arbitration award, although final and complete when issued, is rendered incomplete and no longer final when a motion is timely filed with the arbitrator to modify the award, therefore tolling the 30 day period in which a petition to vacate the award can be filed with the Court. In accordance with Mandl,  the Court found the Petition to Vacate was timely because filed within 30 days of delivery of the corrected award.

The Circuit Court next addressed whether the arbitrator panel exceeded its jurisdiction when making a $433,722 award to the Plaintiff LLC for consequential costs of the LLC’s sole member. The Court found that the Defendant participated in the arbitration without objection about jurisdiction or the appropriateness of a consequential costs award to the Plaintiff LLC’s sole member. The Circuit Court further found that the arbitration panel explicitly made the award to the Plaintiff LLC and not to the LLC’s sole member, therefore no jurisdictional issues were present.  

Next, the Circuit Court addressed the Defendant’s claim that the award for the consequential costs was “completely irrational” and a “manifest disregard of the law.” Although “manifest disregard of the law” is not stated as grounds to vacate an award in the Federal Arbitration Act or the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, the Court followed Sharp v. Downey, 197 Md. App. 123 cert. granted, 419 Md. 646 (2011) in applying the doctrine under principles of stare decisis. Reviewing authorities, the Circuit Court found that the “manifest disregard” standard requires some showing in the record, other than the obtained result, that the arbitrators knew the law and consciously disregarded it. The Circuit Court found that the Defendant never presented an issue to the arbitrators as to an award of the amount of the LLC’s sole member’s consequential costs and the arbitrators never provided any explanation for the award. In light of the Defendant’s silence, the award could not be “completely irrational” and the Defendant’s failure to refer the arbitrators to any law on consequential damages was fatal to the requirement of the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine that the record show that the arbitrators were aware of the law and disregarded it.

Finally, the Defendant sought three modifications to the specific performance portion of the award: 1) incorporation of two Project Manuals that were not introduced into evidence, 2) allowing the Defendant to perform a peer-review of the Project Manuals, and 3) allowing value-engineering of the Project Manuals. Because the Project Manuals were not presented into evidence before the arbitrators, the Circuit Court could not conclude whether the proposed modifications would affect the award. Defendant also was silent during the arbitration hearing about peer-reviewing and value-engineering. Consequently, the Circuit Court denied the Defendant’s Petition to Vacate or Modify the Award and granted Plaintiff’s Petition to Confirm the Award.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

MRA Property Management, Inc. v. Armstrong (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed: April 30, 2012

Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia

Held:  The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) could apply to disclosures made in a resale certificate by a condominium association and its management company during the sale of a condominium if the information provided is essential to the transaction, even though neither entity is a direct seller.  A disclosure could also violate the MCPA if it is false or misleading, or had the capacity, tendency, or capability of misleading even if it complies with the Maryland Condominium Act.

Facts:  This case arises from a special assessment imposed on all unit owners of the Tomes Landing Condominiums to pay for water damage to the buildings allegedly caused by improper construction of the buildings and incorrect installation of flashing that allowed water to seep behind the building facades and possibly compromise the structural integrity of the condominiums.  The unit purchasers alleged that the extent of the water damage had been known by the condominium association (the "Association") and its management company ("MRA") since 1996 and they failed to disclose such information in the resale package.  The unit purchasers were granted partial summary judgment in the amount of $1,000,000 against the Association and MRA in circuit court.  The basis for the award was that the operating budget the Association and MRA provided as part of a resale package to unit purchasers violated the MCPA because the budgets “had the capacity, tendency and effect of misleading the movants in connection with their purchases of the condominiums in Tomes Landing….”

The Court of Appeals granted petitions for writ of certiorari and vacated the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment saying that the MCPA does apply, but the Association and MRA were required to disclose only approved, not proposed or contemplated, capital expenditures in the operating budgets they provided to prospective purchasers.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to consider whether the Association and MRA violated § 11-135(a)(4)(x) of the Maryland Condominium Act pertaining to disclosing whether the Association had “knowledge of any violation of the health or building codes with respect to the unit, the limited common elements assigned to the unit, or any other portion of the condominium.”

Both parties filed Motions for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision.

Analysis:  The Court of Appeals granted the motions and decided there could be no violation of §11-135(a)(4)(x) because it is “knowledge of a charged violation…rather than the conduct underlying the violation, that requires disclosure” under that section.  As a result the Court found that “[b]ecause they were never issued a notice of any such violations, MRA and the Association could not have violated §11-135(a)(4)(x).”

The Court held that the MCPA may extend to one who is not the direct seller because “[i]t is quite possible that a deceptive trade practice committed by someone who is not the seller would so infect the sale or offer for sale to a consumer that the law would deem the practice to have been committed ‘in’ the sale or offer for sale.”  Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 32 (2005).  Under the principles espoused in Hoffman, the Court found that the operating budgets provided by the Association and MRA “could have sufficiently implicated them in the entire transaction so as to impose liability under the [MCPA], given that every plaintiff averred in his or her affidavit that he or she would not have purchased a unit if the budget…had disclosed the expenses necessary to correct the problems with the condominium buildings.” 

In addition, the Court found that the statutory requirement to make certain disclosures to potential unit owners “injects MRA and the Association into the sale transaction as central participants because, were they to have failed to provide these materials, the contract for sale would not have been enforceable.”

The Court overruled the trial judge’s entry of summary judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Cecil County to decide whether the mandatory disclosures made by the Association and MRA were false or misleading, or had the capacity, tendency, or capability of misleading in violation of the MCPA.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Scotch Bonnett Realty Corp. v. Matthews (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed: January 21, 2011.

Opinion by Judge Lawrence F. Rodowsky.

Held: The use of a deed that is neither a forged document, nor signed with a forged signature, but which derives its transactional vitality from forged corporate articles of amendment, does not render a conveyance of land void ab initio; rather, good title is transferred to bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

Facts: Scotch Bonnett Realty Corporation ("SBRC") is a Maryland corporation in the business of buying and selling real estate. An amendment to SBRC's articles of incorporation was filed two years after its formation. The amendment stated that "Corey Johnson is to be added as an officer of Company." At the bottom of the amendment was a signature line preprinted for "President" on which was signed "Richard Hackerman." The signature was forged.

Corey Johnson conveyed property on behalf of SBRC to a third party. The third party later entered into Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. On certification from the Maryland Bankruptcy Court, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the use of a deed which derives transactional vitality from forged articles of amendment renders a conveyance of land void ab initio

Analysis: The Court of Appeals held that such a conveyance is not void ab initio and instead transfers good title to bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The court noted that holding otherwise would inject uncertainty into a property owner's chain of title. A property owner's title, according to the court, should not be at risk simply because a grantor in the chain of title decides that a conveyance has been induced by a written misrepresentation, even if the misrepresentation includes a forged signature.

The full opinion is available in pdf.

Abdou-Malik Yacoubou Adam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Filed: July 28, 2010

Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Motz


Held: A complaint alleging alleging the defendant harassed the plaintiff with dozens of phone calls every week states a claim for strict liability for malicious conduct under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.


Facts: The plaintiff owned a property with a mortgage serviced by the defendant. In June 2008, the defendant began charging $22.42 more per month after receiving updated tax information. The plaintiff disputed the increase and made payments under the original monthly rate. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed to a loan modification agreement in November 2008 regarding payments beginning in January 2009. However, the plaintiff's January payment was returned. Upon inquiry, the plaintiff was informed the loan modification agreement was null and void and he needed to sign another contract. The defendant rejected the plaintiff's February payment for an amount equaling two months payment under the loan modification agreement. The plaintiff then "began to receive regular harassing phone calls from the defendant threatening foreclosure."


The plaintiff sued for, among other things, compensation of injuries arising out of the revised loan modification agreement. The defendant moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss counts II and V of the plaintiff's complaint, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion or national origin and strict liability for malicious conduct.


Analysis: To state a "claim of discrimination in lending practices, a plaintiff must allege (1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected class who sought a loan for property; (2) that plaintiff qualified for a loan; (3) that a bank denied plaintiff's application; and (4) that other similarly situated applicants who were not in the protected classes received loans or were treated more favorably." The plaintiff's claim was dismissed because he failed to plead sufficient facts to permit a conclusion that discrimination was a factor.


With respect to the strict liability claim, the Court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff's allegation of strict liability is not a recognized common law tort cause of action in Maryland. However, the Court, after providing some assistance to the pro se plaintiff's argument, permitted the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's alleged harassment states a plausible claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Act is a strict liability statute. And, it prohibits the defendant's use of repeated telephone calls with the intent to "annoy, abuse, or harass," allegations made in the plaintiff's complaint. The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's strict liability count.


The full opinion is available in pdf.

Allen v. Dackman (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed: March 22, 2010
Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene, Jr.

Held: An individual member of an LLC may be exposed to personal liability if he commits, inspires or participates in a tort. In addition, under the Baltimore Housing Code, an individual member of an LLC that owns a residential property may be subject to personal liability for violations of the Code as an "owner", as the term is defined, if he has "control" over the title, notwithstanding the liability shield of the LLC.

Facts: An LLC acquired a property in Baltimore City in order to sell it and turn a profit. At the time of purchase, the LLC was unaware that prior renters remained on the property. The LLC later became aware of the prior renters and requested that they vacate the premises. The prior renters did not comply and eventually had to be forcibly removed from the premises.

Two young children lived with the prior renters. They suffered elevated blood-lead levels, allegedly caused by lead paint on the premises, both before and after the LLC acquired the property. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against both the LLC and an individual that was a member of the LLC (the “Individual”), alleging a negligence action based on violations of the Baltimore City Housing Code.

The Individual filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he could not be held personally liable as a matter of law because his only involvement with the property was through the LLC. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Analysis: In a 5-2 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a jury could have found the Individual personally liable. While an LLC member is generally not liable for torts committed by the LLC, the court stated that such a member could be liable if it committed, inspired or participated in the tort. The court held that because the Individual managed the LLC’s day-to-day affairs, a jury could have found that the Individual personally participated in the LLC’s decisions regarding the alleged negligent maintenance of the property. According to the court, such participation would permit personal liability for the Individual.

An additional issue on appeal was whether the Individual could be considered an "owner" under the Housing Code. Compliance with the Housing Code is only the responsibility of owners. The court ultimately held that a jury could have found that the Individual was an owner and so summary judgment was inappropriate. In so holding, the court stated the definition of owner under the Housing Code includes those who "control" title to a dwelling and it was a question for the jury whether the Individual had control, notwithstanding that the LLC owned the title.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

JLB Realty, LLC v. Capital Development, LLC (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Filed: March 3, 2010
Opinion by Judge Benson Everett Legg

Holding: Purchaser was not equitably estopped from terminating contract for the purchase of real estate and receiving return of earnest money deposit, nor did it breach the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, when it gave termination notice to the Seller in accordance with the parties' agreement and expenses incurred by the Seller were not incurred until after the Purchaser had already delivered to the Seller its termination notice.

Facts: The parties entered into a contract for the purchase of real estate in Baltimore, Maryland, which afforded the Purchaser a right to terminate the contract and secure the return of its earnest money if the purchaser discovered a blemish on the title during the review period.

The Purchaser discovered a blemish on the title within the discovery period – a Land Disposition Agreement (LDA) with the City of Baltimore, which limited development of the real estate to not more than 30 dwelling units per acre. The Purchaser and Seller agreed that the LDA was cause for the Purchaser to terminate the contract, but further agreed that the Seller would have 45 days to negotiate a release of the LDS with the City and that the Purchase had the right to terminate the Contract by written notice to the Seller at any time before a release of the LDA was executed and recorded.

The Seller was unable to negotiate a release of the LDS and the Purchaser determined that it would either exercise the 45 day termination right or, if the parties could agree, proceed under a revised agreement that included substantial modifications to the initial transaction. The parties acknowledged from that point forward that the original agreement was defunct.

The parties were unable to negotiate any further agreements and the Purchaser provided the Seller with written notice of termination.

The Seller refused to return the earnest money and Purchaser sued and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Seller opposed.

Analysis: No reasonable jury could conclude that the Seller considered the original deal to be in full force and effect, or that the Purchaser intended to pursue the deal as laid out in the initial contract. Further, the Seller’s alleged detriment - $400,000 paid to the City to release the LDA – was not incurred until after the Purchaser terminated the contract.

Moreover, no breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing can occur where the matter is covered by an express contract clause. It was undisputed that the First Amendment to the contract gave the Purchaser the right to terminate the contract if the LDA had not been released within 45 days. It was clearly understood and acknowledged by the parties that the original agreement was defunct. At no time after the expiration of the 45 day period did the Purchaser ever represent that it intended to waive its right to terminate and proceed with the original deal.

For the full opinion PDF.

Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, Maryland (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed: March 11, 2010.

Opinion by Judge Sally D. Adkins.

Holding: The expenditure of over a million dollars to purchase property and obtain state permits does not, by itself, grant a vested right to a landowner or permit a landowner to succeed in an equitable estoppel claim against a government which has revised its zoning code in a manner that precludes a landowner's intended use of the property.

Facts: Landowner sought to construct a landfill in Harford County. After being included in the County's solid waste management plan, Landowner purchased property for proposed landfill. While the Maryland Department of Environment processed its permit (and just four days after settlement), a new Harford County Council passed a resolution to remove the property from its plan. With litigation pending, the County revised its zoning code in a manner that resulted in the property being disqualified for its Landowner's intended use as a landfill.

Analysis: Landowner argued, among other theories, that it had obtained a vested right in the zoning use and that County should be estopped from applying its new zoning regulation based on equitable and zoning estoppel.

"In order to obtain a vested right in an existing zoning use that will be protected against a subsequent change in a zoning ordinance prohibiting that use, the owner must initially obtain a permit" and must make a substantial beginning in construction to commit the land to its permitted use before the zoning ordinance has been changed. Landowner asserted a substantial change in relation to the land had been made as it purchased the land, made over a million dollars in expenditures (acquisition, engineering and legal fees) and incurred obligations in proceeding with the the engineering development plans for the State's permitting process. The Court rejected Landowner's argument holding that neither the purchase of property nor expenditure of funds in preparation for development is sufficient to grant a vested right in an existing zoning use.

The Court denied Landowner's theory of equitable estoppel because a court must first make a finding that plaintiff had a vested right. While declining the opportunity to adopt the doctrine of zoning estoppel, the Court discussed the theory in length and recognized "as zoning and permitting processes become more complex, the need for such a doctrine grows." Yet, the Court opined that even if zoning estoppel was recognized, Landowner would not succeed because it could not prove it relied in good faith on an act or omission by the government that caused Landowner to make a substantial change because Landowner "knew of facts that should have given it notice that it should not rely on the government action in question."

Dissent: Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., provided a dissenting opinion, which Chief Judge Robert M. Bell joined. Judge Harrell contended that the Court of Appeals had "again wimp[ed]-out on adopting the doctrine of zoning estoppel." He would have held "that [Harford County] is estopped from applying the provisions of Bill 91-10 to the [Landowner's] proposed rubble landfill, based on [County's] prior approvals of the . . . Site Plan, its inclusion of [the Landowner's] rubble landfill in the [County’s] Solid Waste Management Plan (“SWMP”), the official assurances it gave to [the Landowner] that construction could proceed, and [Landowner's] substantial expenditures made in good faith reliance upon such assurances."

The opinion is available in pdf.

Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Mary B. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed: January 4, 2010
Opinion by Judge Deborah S. Eyler

Held: A recorded deed of trust dated prior to a recorded judgment has priority over the judgment despite the deed of trust being recorded after the judgment.

Facts: On May 11, 2007, a judgment was obtained for $2,000,000 following a tort action involving battery. The judgment-creditor obtained a writ of execution and the sheriff levied on the debtor's real property in Baltimore County. The sheriff's sale was scheduled for October 25, 2007.

On October 18, 2007, Aegis Funding Corporation sued the judgment-creditor and the defendant to enjoin the sheriff's sale and to establish priority of Aegis' lien against the real property.

Aegis had made a loan to the defendant secured by the real property and received a deed of trust dated before the judgment. Through "inadvertence", the deed of trust was not recorded in the land records until after the sheriff's sale was advertised.

Analysis: Section 3-201 of the Real Property Article provides that the effective date of a deed, "is the date of delivery. The delivery date is the last date of acknowledgment or the date stated on the deed, whichever is later." Both the date on the Aegis deed of trust and the date of the last acknowledgment on the deed of trust predated the judgment. Section 3-201 provides that once a deed is recorded, it takes effect from its effective date against every purchaser with notice of the deed and creditor of the grantor with or without notice. The court found the judgment-creditor to be a "creditor" of the defendant rather than a "purchaser."

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Wilkens Square, LLLP v. W.C. Pinkard & Co., Inc. t/a Colliers Pinkard (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed: November 30, 2009
Opinion by Judge Deborah S. Eyler

Held: Proof of dual agency must consist of evidence that the broker represented opposite sides of a transaction when the transaction took place. The mere co-existence of a brokerage agreement and a listing agreement does not constitute a dual agency as a matter of law in Maryland.

Facts: In early 2005, Colliers Pinkard entered into a brokerage agreement with Charles McMann Investments ("CMC") in which Colliers Pinkard would identify potential investment properties for CMC in the Baltimore City/Washington, D.C. area. By August 2005, the relationship between CMC and Colliers Pinkard had not proven successful and CMC and Colliers Pinkard decided that the brokerage agreement would expire on December 31, 2005.

In the meantime, Wilkens Square, LLLP decided to put up for sale an office building it owned at 300 W. Pratt Street in Baltimore City. On November 18, 2005, Wilkens entered into a listing agreement with Colliers Pinkard wherein Colliers Pinkard would serve as Wilkens' broker in the sale of the property.

In December 2005, CMC representatives met with Colliers Pinkard to view properties in the Baltimore area. Wilkens' Pratt Street property was not one of them. Colliers Pinkard suggested that CMC take a look at the Pratt Street property but did not accompany CMC on its visit.

The sale of the Pratt Street property was done by "controlled auction." CMC had shown interest in the Pratt Street property following its visit in December 2005 and as a result Colliers Pinkard added CMC to the list of potential buyers who would receive promotional material and information about the sale. CMC continued to show interest in the property and proceeded with the controlled auction. By February 2006, CMC was one of two remaining bidders on the Pratt Street property. Ultimately, CMC purchased the property on June 14, 2006. Prior to the closing, Colliers Pinkard sent an invoice to Wilkens for its commission under the listing agreement. Wilkens failed to pay Colliers Pinkard's commission.

Colliers Pinkard sued Wilkens for breach of contract seeking payment of its commission. Wilkens filed counterclaims for breach of contract, negligence, intentional concealment of material facts and conspiracy by a fiduciary.

The case in the lower court was tried before a jury which found for Colliers Pinkard on the breach of contract claim and against Wilkens on its counterclaims. The jury awarded Colliers Pinkard $226,321.67 for Wilkens' breach of contract. Wilkens appealed asserting: (1) the trial court erred in not finding, as a matter of law, that Colliers Pinkard was in a dual agency with Wilkens and CMC; (2) the trial court erred by not ruling, as a matter of law, that Colliers Pinkard's relationship with CMC was a material fact that Colliers Pinkard had a duty to disclose; and (3) that the trial court erred by not giving requested jury instructions.

Analysis: A real estate broker stands in a fiduciary relationship to his client. Because of the opposing interests of a buyer and seller in a real estate transaction, a broker cannot represent one without violating his fiduciary duty to the other. Under this theory, Maryland law has long held that a broker cannot profit from a transaction in which he represents opposing parties (a dual agency relationship) without the parties' consent. The court noted that "There are no Maryland dual agency cases that extend the commission forfeiture rule to situations in which a real estate broker . . . has represented two parties to a transaction at different periods of time."

Relying on the holding in Ricker v. Abrams, 263 Md. 509 (1971) that "proof of dual agency must consist of evidence that the broker represented the opposite sides to a transaction when the transaction took place", the court held that Colliers Pinkard was not acting as a dual agent because it did not represent CMC when the sale went forward or when the auction for the sale was held. As a result, the court held that there was no dual agency as a matter of law.

The court dismissed Wilkens' argument that the overlap of the brokerage agreement and the listing agreement from November until December 31, 2005 rendered Colliers Pinkard a dual agent. In its analysis the court explains that the prohibition on dual agency stems from the conflict between the interests of buyer and seller. At the time the contracts overlapped there were no conflicts between Wilkens' and CMC's interests such that Colliers Pinkard would have violated its fiduciary duty.

As to Wilkens' contention that Colliers Pinkard breached its duty to disclose a material fact, the court noted that "the materiality of a fact will depend upon the nature of the transaction and the effect, if any, the fact may have on its outcome." The court held that there was no evidence that Colliers Pinkard's contract with CMC would have been material to Wilkens with respect to the ultimate sale of its property.

Finally, Wilkens argued that the trial court erred in not providing jury instructions on the issue of when disclosure of dual agency must be made. The court dismissed this argument holding that "even if the court had erred by failing to instruct the jury on when disclosure should have been made, the error would not have been prejudicial," because the jury's finding that there was no dual agency rendered as moot the the issue of when disclosure must be made.

The full opinion is available in PDF.