Karen R. Goozh v. Howard Richmond (Cir. Ct. Mont. Cnty.)

Filed: July 8, 2014

Opinion by: Ronald B. Rubin

Holding: A stockholders’ agreement that expired upon the “dissolution” of the company was terminated when the company was administratively dissolved for failure to file a regular report, despite having its charter later reinstated when the failure was cured.

Facts: Stockholders in a Washington, D.C., company entered into a stockholders’ agreement that included a provision whereby the agreement would terminate upon the “liquidation or dissolution of the Company.” The company’s charter was then revoked twice after it failed to file a required biennial report with the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. In each instance, the revocation was eventually annulled, but the Plaintiffs argued that the stockholder’ agreement remained terminated after the first revocation despite such reinstatement.

Analysis: The court noted that a different District of Columbia statute applied to each administrative dissolution of the company. In the second instance, the law stated that when a company’s charter was revoked and later restored, the restoration would “relate back” to the date of the administrative dissolution. In other words, the gap in the company’s continuity would effectively be erased.

The court found two D.C. cases instructive: In Accurate Construction Co. v. Washington, a contract entered into while a company’s charter was revoked was held to be unenforceable, and in T.K., Inc. v. National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Inc., the tenant under a commercial lease was found to have remained a valid party to the lease despite the revocation and subsequent reinstatement of its charter during the lease term.

Finding neither case dispositive, the court said that because the stockholders’ agreement failed to define the term dissolution, the plain meaning of the word should apply. The court acknowledged that the drafters may not have intended a “technical” or “administrative” dissolution of the company to terminate the agreement. Nevertheless, it held that a reasonable person would understand the word dissolution to include such events.

Although the case hinges on D.C. law, the court occasionally draws comparisons with Maryland law and cites Maryland law when discussing the effects of revival.

Full opinion is available in PDF.

Consortium Atlantic Realty Trust, Inc. v. Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund, et al. (Cir. Ct. Mont. Co.)

Filed:  February 5, 2013
Opinion by Judge Ronald B. Rubin

Held:  A board of directors is not subject to Revlon duties when shareholders choose to exercise their put rights under a shareholders agreement.

Facts:  Plaintiff, a Maryland corporation, sued Defendants, union pension funds who owned approximately 93% of the stock in Plaintiff, for breach of a shareholders’ agreement entered into between Plaintiff and Defendants.  Under the shareholders’ agreement, each Defendant was granted the unilateral right to withdraw as a shareholder six years after the effective date of the agreement. Defendants gave proper notice of the exercise of their withdrawal right under the shareholders’ agreement, but the parties disputed the valuation of Defendants’ shares under the withdrawal right. The pertinent section of the shareholders’ agreement required Plaintiff to redeem all of the shares held by a withdrawing shareholder at fair market value. Plaintiff set the fair market value of Defendants' shares at $7.93 per share, the price set forth in an appraisal of one share of stock done two years earlier.  Defendants refused to accept any “discounted” value for their shares, insisting on redemption at $10.00 per share, the price initially paid by Defendants for each share.

Plaintiff filed suit for breach of the shareholders’ agreement. Defendants filed a counterclaim raising a number of claims regarding the shareholders’ agreement and its interpretation, the most pertinent of which was Plaintiff’s failure to maximize shareholder value. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim.

Analysis:  Defendants alleged a breach of fiduciary by Plaintiff and certain of its directors by failing to sell the company before Defendants exercised their withdrawal rights so that the directors could obtain a “windfall” when Defendants redeemed their shares for a discounted value. Defendants also contended that the exercise of their withdrawal rights, which collectively amounted to 93% of Plaintiff’s shares, constituted a change-in-control transaction under Maryland law. In short, the court stated that Defendants were attempting to impose Revlon duties, as applied to Maryland law in Shenker v. Laureate Education, on Plaintiff and its directors.

The court agreed that Shenker is limited, until the Court of Appeals says otherwise, to a cash-out merger when the decision to sell the corporation is already made, and dismissed Defendants’ claims. Here, it was the shareholders, not the board of directors, who made the decision to “sell”, i.e., to exercise their put rights under the shareholders’ agreement. Much like a tender offer situation, the decision to be made, withdraw as, or remain a shareholder does not implicate the duties or functions of the board of directors. Revlon duties were inapplicable because the board had nothing to do with the decision to “sell.”

The court also rejected Defendants’ change of control argument, stating that shareholders cannot unilaterally “create” a change of control implicating Revlon solely by virture of their own decisions. Revlon duties are premised upon action taken by the board, which results in a change from managing the company to selling the company. Plaintiff’s board made no decision to sell, merge or otherwise re-organize the business of the company.  Shareholders cannot impose additional duties on a board solely by reason of their own economic decisions to involve provisions of a shareholders’ agreement.


The full opinion is available in pdf.

Weinberg v. Gold, et al. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Filed: March 12, 2012
Opinion by Judge James K. Bredar

Held: In a shareholder's derivative suit, the plaintiff shareholder failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to excuse demand on the corporation under the demand futility exception set forth in Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123 (Md. 2001).

Facts: Plaintiff Arnold Weinberg (the "Shareholder") brought a derivative suit against various officers and directors of Biomed Realty Trust, Inc. (the "Company") alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty for failing to rescind approval of an executive compensation plan rejected in a "say on pay" vote by the shareholders of the Company. The plan was formulated by a three-member compensation committee of directors and approved by the board. The issue before the Court was whether the Shareholder pled sufficient factual allegations to justify filing the suit without first making a demand on the Company.

Analysis: The Court cited Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123 (Md. 2001) as the most recent, authoritative exposition of Maryland law on the issue of demand futility. Werbowsky affirmed the demand futility exception but limited it to matters in which the "allegations or evidence clearly demonstrate, in a very particular manner, either that (1) a demand, or a delay in awaiting a response to a demand, would cause irreparable harm to the corporation, or (2) a majority of the directors are so personally and directly conflicted or committed to the disputed decision that they cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business judgment rule."

Recognizing the Werbowsky court's clear statement that mere participation in or approval of the challenged transaction by the directors does not excuse demand, the Court dismissed the Shareholder's argument that demand was futile because each director named in the suit was on the board when the compensation plan was approved, three directors were members of the compensation committee and two of the seven directors were officers of the Company and beneficiaries of the compensation plan. The Court recognized that the two directors who were officers of the Company and beneficiaries of the compensation plan were arguably "so personally and directly conflicted" that they could not reasonably be expected to respond to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business judgment rule. However, Werbowsky requires that a majority of the board be so personally disqualified before demand is excused. Likewise, the fact that directors are named in the suit does not mean that prior to the suit demand would have been futile. It if did, the Court opined, the demand requirement would be nullified in every suit that named directors are defendants.

The Shareholder also sought to excuse demand on the basis that the directors' actions were not the product of valid business judgment. Werbowsky, however, implicitly disallows consideration of the merits of the case in analyzing demand futility. While recognizing that a "say on pay" vote can arguably provide the board with an opportunity to reconsider its executive compensation decisions, the Court concluded that it is not the equivalent of a pre-suit demand. Such a vote can, however, be reasonably considered as a non-conclusive factor in the demand futility analysis. The Court also rejected the Shareholder's analysis of the "say on pay" vote under Ohio and Delaware standards for demand futility because neither standard is comparable to the standard set forth in Werbowsky.

The full opinion is available in pdf.

The George Wasserman and Janice Wasserman Goldsten Family Limited Liability Company v. Kay (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed: February 9, 2011

Opinion by Judge James R. Eyler

Held: A claim brought by partners in a general partnership or members of an LLC against a managing partner or managing member will survive a motion to dismiss if they sufficiently allege they suffered harm directly and the managing partner or managing member violated duties owed to the partners or members.

Facts: Plaintiffs are partners in five real estate investment general partnerships and two real estate investment LLCs. Defendants are Mr. Kay, an individual that is the managing member or de facto managing member or partner of the partnerships and LLCs, and Kay Management Company, Inc. and Kay Investment Group, LLC, two entities controlled by Kay. Plaintiffs alleged Defendant took money from the partnerships and LLCs and invested the money with Kay Investment through Kay Management. In turn, Kay Investment invested the money with the Bernard Madoff entities. Plaintiffs brought suit following the Madoff ponzi scheme collapse.

The complaint set forth thirteen counts, including, among others, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, conversion, civil conspiracy and negligence. The Circuit Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss because none of the claims were individual, the derivative claims involving the partnerships were not agreed to by a majority of the partnership, and the failure to make demand on behalf of the LLCs was unexcused.

Analysis:

After a lengthy discussion of corporations, general partnerships and LLCs, the Court framed the principal issues on appeal as (1) whether Plaintiffs may assert individual claims against Kay and (2) whether Plaintiffs may bring derivative claims on behalf of the partnerships and LLCs against Kay.

(1) Individual Claims

Applying logic from Shenker v. Laureate Education, Inc., which permitted a shareholder to bring a direct action when the shareholder suffers the harm directly or duties owed to the shareholder have been violated, the Court extended the rationale to the law of partnerships and LLCs. The Court then concluded Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged (a) they suffered harm directly and (b) Kay violated duties owed directly to the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs alleged Kay took funds that were required to have been distributed. He also took funds required to be held in reserve, further injuring Plaintiffs by forcing them to replace the removed reserves.

Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, general partners owe each other, not just the partnership, fiduciary duties. Section 9A-405(b) of the RUPA "clearly provides a mechanism through which partners can sue other partners directly for breach of those obligations and others." However, there is no statute in Maryland expressly addressing LLC members' fiduciary duties. The Court, after finding managing members to be "agents for the LLC and each of the members, which is a fiduciary position under common law," again applied rationale from Shenker, to state where no statute precludes or limits fiduciary duties under common law, the underlying duties apply. Accordingly, the Court found Kay's fiduciary duties as the managing partner/member to run to the partnerships, the LLCs, the partners and the members.

(2) Derivative Claims

The Court found the term "derivative" inappropriate in a general partnership context. Derivative actions are necessary in a corporate and limited partnership context because shareholders and limited partners have no management rights. "Unlike shareholders and limited partners, however, general partners all have the ability to act on behalf of the partnership, and all have management rights." Accordingly, no need for a derivative action exists. The Court turned to whether minority general partners can bring claims against other partners. The Court cited many sections of RUPA to conclude all partners have equal ability to enforce rights involving partnership property. While section 9A-405(j) of RUPA requires unanimous consent of all the partners, the Court felt it should be tempered "when non-plaintiff partners have conflicts of interest." Instead, "the unanimity requirement should not apply to defendant partners and other interested partners."

However, based on the facts, the Court found a suit on behalf of the partnerships unnecessary because Plaintiffs adequately alleged an individual direct injury. If Plaintiff's prove the allegations, complete relief will be afforded. The derivative claims on behalf of the LLC were rejected for the same reason.

Note: In discussing fiduciary duties in the LLC context, the Court, citing section 4A-402(a) of the Maryland Limited Liability Company Act, notes that "one Maryland statute governing LLC operating agreements does suggest that provisions within operating agreements could alter existing duties or create other duties..." However, no such provisions were alleged in the case.

The full opinion is available in pdf.

In re Terra Industries, Inc. (Balt. City Cir. Ct.)

Filed: July 14, 2010
Opinion by Judge Evelyn Omega Cannon

Held: An exculpatory clause in a corporation's charter holding directors harmless from personal liability to the corporation or shareholders to the fullest extent of the law is enforceable, and it justified entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant directors. Section 1-102 of the Corporations and Associations Article is expansive and applies to every Maryland corporation and to all their corporate acts.

Facts: CF, a competitor of Terra, made numerous attempts to acquire Terra through unsolicited bids. Terra rejected those offers. CF bought Terra stock on the open market, which allowed it three seats on Terra's Board of Directors. Terra later told CF that it was not for sale and CF withdrew its offer to acquire Terra and announced it was no longer pursuing the acquisition. Unbeknownst to CF, Terra was entertaining other potential interests in its acquisition. CF later made another offer to acquire Terra which was accepted by the Board and the two companies merged.

Before the Terra/CF merger, four actions were filed, two of which were Maryland cases and consolidated into this action, alleging, among other things, that the individual defendants breached fiduciary duties by approving the Terra/CF merger. Terra's charter contained a provision which provides: "To the fullest extent permitted by statutory or decisional law . . . no director or officer of the Corporation shall be personally liable to the Corporation or its stockholders for money damages."

Analysis: The court found that the exculpatory clause was applicable, Plaintiffs had not pled facts of active and deliberate dishonesty, and the exculpatory clause may form the basis for granting a motion for summary judgment. Both section 2-405.2 of the Corporations and Associations Article and section 5-418 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code allow the charter of a corporation to include any provision expanding or limiting the liability of its directors and officers. The court also found that actions taken in the sale or merger of a corporation are "corporate acts" as contemplated by section 1-102 of the Corporations and Associations Article and discussed in Shenker v. Laureate Education, Inc., 411 Md. 317 (2009).

The full opinion is available in pdf.

Boland v. Boland (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed: September 14, 2010
Opinion by Judge Deborah S. Eyler

Held: Courts must apply the business judgment rule in reviewing the decision of a board’s special litigation committee not to pursue a derivative claim alleging self-dealing.

Facts: Certain shareholders (the “Shareholders”) of Boland Trane Associates, Inc. and Boland Trane Services, Inc. (collectively, the “Corporations”) filed derivative claims against the Corporations, alleging that their directors engaged in self-dealing transactions. The directors appointed a special litigation committee to investigate whether to pursue the derivative claims. After conducting an investigation, the committee determined that the claims had no merit and advised that the directors seek to have the claims dismissed.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Corporations, deferring to the special litigation committee’s decision under the business judgment rule. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

Analysis: The Court of Special Appeals held that the business judgment rule was the proper standard of review. Maryland case law has already addressed the level of deference courts must give to determinations of special litigation committees. A new standard does not apply simply because the Shareholders characterize their claims as alleging self-dealing. Unless the actual members of the special litigation committee themselves engaged in self-dealing (which was not the case), the court must defer to the committee’s decision in accordance with the business judgment rule.

The full opinion is available in pdf.

Shoregood Water Company, Inc. v. U.S. Bottling Company (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Filed: May 11, 2010

Opinion by Judge Richard D. Bennett

Held: Under Maryland law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, when a shareholder seeks to pursue a derivative action on behalf of a corporation in receivership, the shareholder must allege with particularity any efforts to have the receiver institute suit or why such efforts would be futile.

Facts: Shareholders of companies in receivership, which also were also defendants in litigation, alleged derivative counterclaims on behalf of the companies. The shareholders alleged that the companies lacked the resources to prosecute the claims. The shareholders did not explain whether the companies exhausted their legal proceedings, nor did they describe the circumstances surrounding the companies' actions in seeking redress. The shareholders also failed to allege with particularity any effort to make the receiver institute suit or why such efforts would be futile. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the shareholder derivative actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Shenker v. Laureate Education, Inc. (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed November 12, 2009
Opinion by Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.

Held: Where corporate directors exercise non-managerial duties outside the scope of §2-405.1(a) of the Maryland Corporations and Associations Article, such as negotiating the price that shareholders will receive for their shares in a cash-merger after the decision to sell the corporation has already been made, they owe their shareholders common law duties of candor and good faith efforts to maximize shareholder value and shareholders may bring direct claims for breach of those fiduciary duties.

Facts: In 2006 and 2007, Laureate Education, Inc., a publicly-held Maryland corporation, underwent a private acquisition process whereby several directors ("Board Respondents") and private equity investors ("Investor Respondents") purchased Laureate through a cash-out merger transaction.

In June 2006, Laureate's Chairman and CEO Douglas L. Becker informed the Board of Directors that he intended to make an offer to purchase Laureate, at which time the Board created a Special Committee composed of three independent directors, who retained a law firm and financial advisors. The Special Committee approved Becker's second offer to purchase Laureate for $60.50 per share and unanimously recommended that the Board approve the proposed transaction on January 28, 2007.

On January 30, 2007, various Laureate shareholders ("Petitioners") challenged the proposed merger on the grounds that the Board Respondents breached their fiduciary duty, that they conspired to breach those duties, and that they and the Investor Respondents aided and abetted that breach.

The Circuit Court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss, dismissing the action as an impermissible direct shareholder suit where the Petitioners had "failed to allege a cognizable duty owed them" by Investor Respondents.

In June 2007, Laureate announced that it had accepted an increased offer from Investor Respondents to acquire Laureate at $62 per share by way of a tender offer and second-step merger. The Special Committee's financial advisors again concluded the offer as financially fair, although several of Laureate's institutional shareholders disagreed, and the Board approved the transaction. Petitioners filed a second complaint in the Circuit Court alleging that the Board Respondents breached their fiduciary duties owed to Petitioners and the Circuit Court again dismissed the claims.

The Circuit Court held that a direct action against corporate directors for alleged violations of fiduciary duties is unavailable in Maryland because §2-405.1(g) forecloses exactly these types of claims. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court's dismissal, holding that §2-405.1(g) bars all direct shareholder claims and that any claims by shareholders against directors for breach of fiduciary duties must be brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation.

Analysis: The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals that §2-405.1(a) provides the only source of duties owed by corporate directors and that §2-405.1(g) bars all direct shareholder claims against those corporate directors for breach of their fiduciary duties. The Court held that such conclusions are erroneous and shareholders may indeed bring direct suits against corporate directors for breach of common law duties of candor and good faith efforts in particular circumstances, such as in the context of a cash-out merger transaction.

The Court stated that directors and officers owe a duty of care to the corporation and its shareholders under §2-405.1(a). Petitioners conceded that §2-405.1(a) governed the sole source of directorial duties in instances that involve the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. However, Petitioners argued, additional common law duties are triggered once a "threshold decision to sell the corporation has been made and which concern only matters personal to the shareholders." The Court agreed, holding that directors of Maryland corporations owe fiduciary duties of candor and maximization of shareholder value to their shareholders beyond those enumerated in §2-405.1(a) made outside the purely managerial context, such as when faced with an inevitable or highly likely change-of-control situation, and at least in the context of negotiating the amount shareholders will receive in a cash-out merger.

In the context of a cash-out merger, the Court stated, directors assume a different role than solely "managing the business and affairs of the corporation." The Court cited the pivotal Delaware case Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) numerous times in support of its holding that duties concerning the management of the corporation's affairs change after the decision is made to sell the corporation. Directors act as fiduciaries on behalf of the shareholders in negotiating a share price that shareholders will receive. The Court also stated that a 1997 opinion by the Maryland Attorney General suggests that the General Assembly did not seek to occupy the entire field of directorial duties owed by corporate directors in enacting §2-405.1(a), but instead intended to codify the duty of care owed by directors in exercising their managerial duties.

In addition to its holding regarding directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders in particular situations, the Court also held that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that §2-405.1(g) bars all shareholder direct claims. Claims for breach of common law fiduciary duties of candor and maximization of shareholder value may be brought directly by shareholders despite the language of §2-405.1(g). The Court held that Petitioners in this case were not restricted to derivative claims and could pursue direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty because the shareholders were owed direct fiduciary duties from the Board Respondents. In support of this holding, the Court noted that the injury alleged here, that shareholders received too low a value for their shares in a cash-out merger, was an injury suffered solely by the shareholders and not Laureate as a corporation. Laureate's interests would not be implicated by the price received by shareholders, nor would it suffer harm as a result of the price.

The Court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals and rejected the civil conspiracy claims, holding that "a defendant may not be adjudged liable for civil conspiracy unless that defendant was legally capable of committing the underlying tort alleged."

The Court also affirmed the Court of Special Appeals in rejecting the aiding and abetting claims, holding that the actions of the Investor Respondents were not out of the normal course of business practices.

The full opinion is available in PDF.